When Does the In-Group Like the Out-Group? Bias Among Children as a Function of Group Norms by Rutland, Adam et al.
Running head: When Does the In-Group Like the Out-Group? 
 
 















Goldsmiths, University of London, UK 
b
Tulane University, New Orleans, USA 
c
University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA
 
d
University of Kent, Canterbury, UK 
e
University of Maryland, College Park, USA 
Psychological Science 'in press' 
Acknowledgements:  
This project was supported by a grant from the  National Science Foundation (#0840492) 
awarded to the last author. We are grateful for helpful feedback on the manuscript from  Shelby 
Cooley and Laura Elenbaas. In addition, we thank Shelby Cooley, Laura Elenbaas, Jamie Ott, 
Nilo Fallay-Sohy, Rachel Hoffman, and Nicole Leyton for assistance with data collection.  
 
Corresponding author: 
Adam Rutland, PhD, Professor of Social Developmental Psychology, Department of Psychology, 
Goldsmiths, University of London, New Cross, London SE14 6NW, UK, Phone +44 (0)20 7078 
5442  Email: a.rutland@gold.ac.uk 
Co-authors: Aline Hitti, ahitti@tulane.edu, Kelly Lynn Mulvey, mulveykl@mailbox.sc.edu, 
Dominic Abrams, d.abrams@kent.ac.uk & Melanie Killen, mkillen@umd.edu 
Running head: When Does the In-Group Like the Out-Group? 
 




Research indicates that in-group favoritism is prevalent among both adults and children.  While 
research has documented that individuals do not consistently display an in-group bias the 
conditions under which out-group preference exists are not well understood.  In this study, 
participants (N = 462), aged 9-16 years, judged in-group deviant acts which were either in line 
with, or counter, to a generic norm shared by both groups. The findings demonstrated, for the 
first time, that children preferred out-group over in-group deviance only when deviance by the 
in-group peer was in line with the generic norm and a threat to their group's identity. Participants 
justified their disapproval for these deviants by focusing on the need for group cohesion and 
loyalty, while they signified approval by spotlighting the need for autonomy. Our findings 
suggest that children's intergroup attitudes are influenced by how the behavior of their peers 
matches different levels of group norms.  
 
 
Keywords: in-group bias, group norms, attitudes, deviance, peer relations, social 
development, reasoning




When does the in-group like the out-group?: Bias among children as a function  
of group norms  
 
 Extensive research in social and cognitive psychology shows that social categories 
readily become either 'Us' or 'Them' -- individuals typically favor 'Us' over 'Them'. This 
pervasive tendency, known as in-group bias, may be related to prejudice (Dovidio, 
Hewstone, Glick, & Estes, 2010; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). In-group bias is highly 
common among children but not universal. For example, low-status or socially-disadvantaged 
children often do not exhibit explicit in-group bias (e.g. Griffiths & Nesdale, 2006; Shutts, 
Kinzler, Katz, Tredoux, & Spelke, 2011). Thus, the ubiquitous assumption that individuals 
are driven by ethnocentric motives to support their in-group may not be the whole story. In 
particular, the conditions under which children prefer out-group members are not well 
understood.   
 Psychological theories have explained out-group favoritism by proposing that 
stereotypes or value consensus across group boundaries can reinforce and legitimate existing 
social systems or hierarchies (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011). For 
example, system justification theory argues that when individuals hold favorable attitudes 
toward the existing social system and status quo this may override their tendency to show in-
group favoritism (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).  
To date, the occurrence of out-group favoritism in childhood has been relatively 
neglected. We argue that an overlooked factor which may determine in-group bias in 
childhood has to do with group norms and how their desire to uphold these norms to augment 
group identity can engender both in-group bias and out-group favoritism (see relevant adult 
research by Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Hogg, 2001). Recent research suggests that even 
preschool children conform to peer group norms (e.g., Corriveau & Harris, 2010) and peer 




groups become increasingly salient in late childhood and adolescence. By adolescence 
individuals are especially concerned about being socially excluded by other peers (e.g, 
Brown, Clasen, & Eicher, 1986; Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2010). This aligns with recent 
developmental neuroscience research into brain development and social exclusion in 
adolescence. Individuals become increasingly sensitive to other's emotions and being rejected 
from the peer group (see Somerville, 2013).  
 Research on the importance of group norms and sensitivity to peer rejection indicates 
that children and adolescents are concerned about adhering to group norms as well as 
favoring members of their own group and this is motivated by a desire for positive group 
identity (see Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Rutland et al., 2010). Indeed 
research on peer group dynamics has revealed that, by middle childhood, individuals prefer a 
member of the out-group who conforms to their in-group's norm (i.e. an out-group deviant) 
over a member of their own group who dissents from their in-group's norm (i.e. an in-group 
deviant) (e.g., Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003). From middle childhood into adolescence 
an individual's understanding of group dynamics continues to develop as they begin to 
consider simultaneously multiple norms, conventional and moral, when making judgments 
and reasoning about social relations within and between groups (Hitti, Mulvey, Rutland, 
Abrams, & Killen, 2014; Killen et al., 2013; Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014; 
Rutland et al., 2010). Given this developmentally sensitive period, the present study focused 
on 9-13 year old participants.  
 Social psychological research, however, has shown that young adults only favor an 
out-group deviant over an in-group deviant when the latter is a full member and the in-group 
lacks a sense of  'groupness' (Lewis & Sherman, 2010; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 
2010). This is because full members have a special role in validating the group's identity, and 
if they deviate from the group's norm they become a meaningful threat to the group's identity 




(Levine & Moreland, 2002).  This research has demonstrated a context with an adult sample 
in which perception of a threat to the group identity may influence the manifestation of in-
group preference. 
 What has not been studied is how different levels of group norms are related to out-
group preference in childhood. Generic norms (defined as societal-level expectations) are 
different from specific group-level norms (defined as expectations held by a specific peer 
group).  Individuals may attend to generic norms that align with shared expectations of a 
specific group more than those norms which are solely formulated by a particular peer group.  
We argue that the out-group preference that has been documented in previous studies 
is most likely when the out-group deviance aligns with larger generic norms, or, in other 
words, when deviance actually conforms to broad societal expectations.  This is a 
fundamental distinction because in this situation the out-group deviance provides two bases 
for attracting favorable responses from an in-group member: supporting the in-group norm, 
and supporting the generic (societal-level) norm.  Understanding this distinction reveals new 
knowledge about how group norms bear on the wider issue of in-group bias and out-group 
preference. 
 Studying this phenomenon in childhood provides novel data that has the potential to 
contribute to the formation of intergroup attitudes. First, understanding the origins of 
prejudice and bias is important for interventions. By adulthood, intergroup biases are deeply 
entrenched; thus, childhood is the time for intervention (see Killen, Rutland, & Ruck, 2011).  
Second, extensive research has shown the powerful influence of specific-level peer group 
norms on children’s development (e.g. Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). Third, children’s daily 
lives, unlike adults, are more constant and organized by both large (school affiliation) and 
local (clubs) groups that are dominated by peers and authority sanctioned. Thus, the role of 




different levels of group norms in the formation of out-group preferences was investigated in 
the current experiment.  
 Specifically, the present study systematically examined, from middle childhood into 
adolescence (i.e., 9-16 year-olds), the role both specific peer group norms and larger societal 
generic norms play in the manifestation of out-group and in-group preference. We examined 
these preferences within the context of school group membership because this group identity 
is central to adolescents' lives (Eccles & Roeser, 2013). Further, previous research using a 
school context revealed that children who judged an out-group deviant were more favorable 
than children who judged an in-group deviant (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003).  
 We used a within-participants design to test whether this preference persists when 
individuals judge both an in-group and an out-group deviant. We tested the hypothesis that 
this favoritism depends on whether the deviant from a group norm simultaneously conforms 
or not to a generic norm -- one that applies to both the in-group and out-group.  Thus, the 
current study fills a key gap in our current understanding of the role that group norms play on 
the manifestation of in-group bias.   
 Uniquely, in the present study we varied the type of deviance shown by an in-group 
and out-group deviant peer. The deviants opposed their group's norm in favor of the other 
groups' norm, and concurrently either conformed or not to a generic norm. Specifically, we 
told participants that it was the tradition (i.e., larger societal expectation or generic norm), 
that children wear their club shirts to community-wide events for all the clubs.  Critically, 
though, some groups aligned with this generic norm while some resisted.  Thus, we presented 
participants with in- and out-group deviants who were either “traditional” (wearing the club 
shirt, even though the group did not) or “non-traditional” (not wearing the club shirt, even 
though the group did).  




We expected preference for out-group over in-group deviance would only occur when 
the deviant conformed to the traditional norm. This type of traditional deviance by the out-
group member not only aligns with the in-group norm but also with the generic norm. 
Whereas such deviance by an in-group deviant should be a fundamental threat to the group's 
identity because it also supports a generic norm shared with the out-group. This endorsement 
is a challenge to the distinctiveness of the in-group compared to the out-group (Tajfel, 1978). 
In contrast, favoritism for out-group over in-group deviance should not be present when the 
deviant also dissents from the traditional norm because this type of behavior infers low status 
upon all individuals within schools (Eccles & Roeser, 2013; Turiel, 1983). Therefore, both 
in-group and out-group deviants should be equally disliked.  
 The present study also examined the social reasoning individuals use to justify 
deviance. Social reasoning developmental theory asserts that  reasoning about deviance 
provides important information about why deviance within groups is condemned or tolerated 
(see Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland et al., 2010). Similar to Kuhn’s (1991) research on 
argumentation and Saxe’s (2009) neuroscience research on individuals’ interpretations of 
social interactions, we used reasoning analyses to examine the conceptual interpretations of 
events posed to participants regarding third-party behavior (in contrast to revealing “post-
hoc” justifications of an individuals’ own behavior). Research indicates that from childhood 
into adolescence adherence to social-conventional traditions has been viewed as a matter of 
personal choice (Horn, 2003) or as group loyalty or group functioning (Killen et al., 2013). 
We therefore expected our participants to use autonomy reasoning to justify tolerance of 
deviance, and group functioning (i.e., maintaining group cohesion) or group loyalty (i.e., 
being faithful to others) reasoning to denounce deviance.   
 Finally, we were interested in whether children's sensitivity towards group norms and 
the pressure to conform (Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005; Rutland, Cameron, 




Milne, & McGeorge, 2005) becomes stronger into adolescence. We, therefore, investigated 
from middle childhood into adolescence age-related differences in the relationship between 
individual's own evaluations of deviance and their expectations about how their in-group 
peers would evaluate deviance. We anticipated that into adolescence the importance of group 
norms and concerns about peer group rejection will only increase (Killen et al., 2013; 
Somerville, 2013). We expected, when out-group deviance is preferred to in-group deviance, 
that the relationship between the perceived in-group norm and participant's own evaluation of 
the deviant act would be significantly stronger with age. 
   Method 
Participants  





 Grade and 10
th
 Grade respectively): 85 (43 female) 9-10 
year olds (M = 10.10 years, SD = .60); 263 (127 female) 13-14 year olds (M = 13.82 years, 
SD = .44) and 114 (41 female) 15-16 year olds (M= 15.97, SD = .57). The participants 
attended schools serving middle-income populations, with an ethnic mix reflective of the 
U.S. population. Ethnicity was reflective of the U.S. population, with approximately 70% 
European-American and 30% ethnic minority participants (10% African American, 15% 
Latino, 5% Asian American). 
Design and Procedure 






 Grade) × Group (In-group vs. 
Out-group) × Type of deviance (Traditional or Non-traditional), with the last factor being 
within-participants. To establish group membership, participants were told that they belonged 
to a mixed-gender peer club at their actual school (i.e., the in-group). They were also shown 
an illustration (see Figure 1 in Supplemental Material) of a group of mixed-gender children in 




a peer club from a familiar school in the participant’s school district which often served as a 
competitive context for sports and teams (i.e., the out-group).  
Next all participants were told that the school district provided club shirts which 
students were expected to wear at district special events (e.g., assemblies) so that everyone 
can be identified.  This established a generic norm (i.e., tradition), shared by in-group and 
out-group, about wearing a club shirt to special events. Then participants were introduced to 
their in-group norm and the out-group norm which either matched (i.e. wearing a club shirt) 
or was counter (i.e., not wearing club shirt) to the tradition.  
Two deviants from the in-group and out-group club were then portrayed as 
challenging their group norm and following the norm of the other group. The type of 
deviance shown by these two peers differed. The “Traditional Deviant” was the group 
member who conformed to the traditional norm by wearing the club shirt, but deviated from 
their group norm of not wearing the club shirt to district event (i.e., traditional condition). 
The “Non-Traditional Deviant” did not conform to the traditional norm, so they did not wear 
the club shirt to the event, and therefore deviated from their group's norm of wearing the club 
shirt to the event (i.e., non-traditional condition). Table 1 displays the four types of deviant 
behaviors within our design (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Study Conditions Depicting Four Types of Deviant Behavior for a 2 X 2 Design 
 Type of Deviance 
Group Traditional Non-traditional 
In-group deviant Wears the club shirt when 
their group does not 
Does not wear the club shirt 
when their group does 
Out-group deviant Wears the club shirt when 
their group does not 
Does not wear the shirt when 
their group does 
 
Measures and Analysis 
 For each deviant behavior participants responded to four dependent measures: 1) 
Evaluation of the deviant act, okay or not okay (i.e., Do you think X (deviant peer) was okay 




or not okay to do what he/she did?); 2) Rating of the deviant act, Likert scale (i.e., How okay 
or not okay do you think X was for doing what he/she did? 1 = really not okay to 6 = really 
okay); 3) Reasoning, justification for evaluation of deviant act  (e.g., Why?); and 4) 
Perceived in-group norm about evaluating the deviant peer (e.g. How do you think the group 
feels about having X in the group? 1 = very bad to 6 = very good). 
  Responses to the reasoning question were coded using coding categories drawn from 
Social Domain Theory (Smetana, 2013; Turiel, 2006), previous research (e.g. Killen et al., 
2013) and a content review of the pilot data. Consistent with previous research on social 
exclusion, participants referenced social-conventional reasoning involving notions of group 
loyalty and group functioning, as well as personal reasoning related to individual choice and 
autonomy (Killen et al., 2013). The coding system used comprised three categories, 
including: 1) Group Loyalty (e.g., “He didn't show commitment to us”); 2) Group 
Functioning (e.g., “He will upset things because he's going against what the group wants”) 
and 3) Autonomy (e.g., “It’s okay for him to be different; he can do what he wants to do”).  
Less than 5% of the participants used two codes. Justification responses were 
analyzed using an established data analytic procedure (see Killen et al., 2013): each 
justification was coded as 1 = full use of the category, .5 = partial use, 0 = no use of the 
category. Coding was conducted by three coders blind to the hypotheses of the study. On the 
basis of 25% of the interviews (N =116), there was appropriate inter-rater reliability, Cohen’s 
 = .86. ANOVAs were used to analyze proportions as they are robust to the problem of 
empty cells compared to other data analytic procedures (e.g., log-linear models) (see 
Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001).  
Results 
Initial analyses examined gender differences, but as no results were significant, 
gender was dropped from the analyses. 




Rating of the Deviant Act 






) × 2 (Group: In-group, Out-group) × 2 (Type of Deviance: 
Traditional, Non-traditional) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor, found main 
effects for Group, F (1,455) = 4.21, p = .041, η2p = .01, and Type of Deviance, F (1,455) = 
125.66, p = .001, η2p
 
= .22. There was also, as anticipated, a significant interaction between 
Group and Type of Deviance, F (1,455) = 5.66, p = .018, η2p
 
= .01. Simple main effects 
analysis showed that participants rated the traditional deviant act (i.e., wearing the shirt when 
the group does not) by the out-group peer (M = 4.60, SD = 1.49) as more acceptable than the 
same act by the in-group peer (M = 4.19, SD = 1.48; t (461) = 2.92, p < .01, d = .28). In 
contrast, participants rated the non-traditional deviant act (i.e., not wearing the shirt when the 
group does) by the in-group (M = 3.24, SD = 1.42) and out-group (M = 3.29, SD = 1.47) as 
equally unacceptable, t(460) = -.37, p = .71. Participants thought an out-group deviant act 
was more tolerable than an in-group deviant act only when it was in line with the generic 
school norm (i.e., traditional). T-tests were also conducted against the midpoint value of 3.5. 
These results revealed that both the traditional deviant acts were significantly above the 
midpoint (in-group: t (227) = 7.230, p < .001; out-group: t (234) = 11.237, p < .001) and that 
both the non-traditional deviant acts were significantly below the mid-point (in-group: t (233) 
= -2.758, p = .006; out-group: t (227) = -2.120, p = .035). These findings are shown in Figure 
1. 





Figure 1. Evaluations of the acceptability of the deviant acts for the in-group and out-group 
members in the traditional and non-traditional conditions. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM. 
Reasoning About the Traditional Deviant Act 






) × 2 (Group: In-group, Out-group) × 2 
(Evaluation of Deviant Act: Okay, Not Okay) × 3 (Reasoning: Group loyalty, Group 
functioning, Autonomy) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor. As anticipated, 
the ANOVA showed a significant Reasoning by Evaluation of Act interaction, F (2,856) = 
30.63, p < .001, η2p
 
= .06. Simple main effects showed differences in reasoning among both 
the participants who evaluated the act as Okay, F (2,427) = 226.87, p < .001, η2p 
 
= .51, and 
Not Okay, F (2,427) = 91.95 p < .001, η2p 
 
= .30.  
 Participants who evaluated the act as Not Okay (n = 123, 26%) used group 
functioning reasoning (e.g., "It would disrupt the group"; M = .78, SD = .41) significantly 
more than autonomy reasoning (e.g., "She’s doing her own thing"; M = .14, SD = .34) 
(Bonferroni, p < .001). In contrast, participants who evaluated the act as Okay (n = 340, 74%) 
used both autonomy (M = .42, SD = .48) and group functioning (M = .31, SD = .45) 






























traditional deviant act as Not Okay; while they used autonomy reasoning (e.g., “It’s up to her 
if she wants to wear the shirt’) when evaluating the traditional deviant act as Okay. 
Reasoning about the Non-Traditional Deviant Act 






) × 2 (Group: In-group, Out-group) × 2 
(Evaluation of the Deviant Act: Okay, Not Okay) × 3 (Reasoning: Group loyalty, Group 
functioning, Autonomy) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. The ANOVA 
showed a significant Reasoning by Evaluation of the Act by Grade interaction, F (4, 840) = 
4.00, p < .01, η2p 
 
= .02.  
 Next, we conducted two separate ANOVAs on the participants who chose Okay (n = 






) × 3 (Reasoning: Group loyalty, Group functioning, Autonomy) ANOVAs with 
repeated measures on the last factor. There was a Reasoning by Grade interaction for the 
participants who evaluated the act as Not Okay, F (4, 405) = 5.63, p < .001, η2p 
 
= .04. Simple 
main effects analyses showed an age effect on group loyalty, F (2, 252) = 9.80, p < .001, η2p 
 
= .07, and group functioning reasoning, F (2, 252) = 5.80, p < .01, η2p 
 
= .04, for the 
participants who evaluated the act as Not Okay. These age effects are shown in Figure 2.  
Follow-up analyses on when the act was judged Not Okay showed the Grade 10 
adolescents (M = .23, SD = .42) used group loyalty reasoning (e.g., "She is just doing what 
she wants and doesn't care about us") significantly more than 4th Grade (M = .03, SD = .16) 
and 8th Grade (M = .06, SD = .24) children (Bonferroni, ps < .001). These analyses also 
showed 4th Grade children (M = .84, SD = .34) used group functioning reasoning 
significantly more than 8
th
 Grade (M = .67, SD = .45, Bonferroni, p < .05) and 10th Grade (M 
= .55, SD = .49) adolescents (Bonferroni, p < .01).  





Figure 2. Proportion of reasoning used by 4th, 8th and 10th Grade to justify their judgment of 
non-traditional deviant acts as a function of their evaluation of the act 
Relationship between Perceived Group Norm and Rating of the Deviant Act 
 We expected, when the deviant conformed to the traditional norm, that the 
relationship between the perceived in-group norm and the participant's own rating of the 
deviant act would be significantly stronger among the older compared to younger individuals. 
To test our hypothesis, in IBM SPSS 19 using bootstrapping, we entered the centered 
continuous variables for Age and Perceived group norm together with their interaction term 
hierarchically to predict the participants' ratings of the traditional and non-traditional deviant 
acts. 
 Perceived group norm was a significant predictor of how the participants rated the 
traditional deviant act (β = .28, t = 6.47, p = .001; R2= .10, F (3, 462) = 16.83, p < .001). 
Their rating of the act became more positive the more they perceived their group to be 
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interaction between Age and Perceived group norm (β = .11, t = 2.49, p = .013). Simple 
slopes analyses revealed the relationship between the participant's perception of their group's 
norm and their own rating of the traditional deviant act was significantly stronger amongst 
the older (t = 6.25, p = .001) compared to the younger (t = 2.36, p = .032) participants. This 
effect is shown in Figure 3. Perceived group norm was also a significant predictor of the 
participants' ratings of the non-traditional deviant act (β = .33, t = 7.51, p < .001; R2= .10, F 
(3, 461) = 19.35, p < .001), but as expected there was no significant interaction between Age 
and Perceived group norm (β = .02, t = .48, p = .63). 
 
Figure 3. Rating of the traditional deviant act for younger and older children as a function of 
perceived in-group norm. For older participants and younger participants, and higher and 
lower group norm scores we substituted values 1 standard deviation above and below the 
means, respectively.  
Discussion 
 In this study we showed, for the first time, how different levels of group norms are 
























same experiment, we showed both the presence and absence of an out-group over in-group 
preference depended upon how the deviance matched the group and generic norm. These 
findings revealed a focus on group norms and how deviation from these norms can engender 
either in-group bias or out-group favoritism helps to better understand the manifestation of 
out-group preference.  
 Overall the participants rated the deviant peers who conformed to the generic norm 
more positively than those who did not support this norm. However, as expected, a 
preference for the out-group deviant over the in-group deviant was only evident when both 
these deviants conformed to the generic norm. This type of deviance is unique in that the out-
group member acts in alignment with the participant’s own group norm and the generic (i.e., 
traditional) norm. Conversely by rejecting the participant’s own group norm and supporting 
the generic norm (i.e., to be traditional) the in-group deviant threatened the distinctiveness of 
the in-group and its group identity (Tajfel, 1978). These findings are also compatible with 
psychological theories that emphasize the importance of conventions and stereotypes in 
perpetuating the status quo (e.g., Jost et al., 2004; Rutland et al., 2010; Turiel, 1983). 
Conventions or traditions typically have high status because they are culturally sanctioned 
behavior and are indicators of social hierarchy. Our participants were arguably signaling their 
broad alignment with convention and the status quo (the 'system') by favoring the out-group 
deviant only when they acted in line with tradition and supported the high status form of 
behavior.   
 The findings for reasoning support this argument since participants justified their 
disapproval for traditional deviants who conformed to the generic norm mostly through group 
functioning reasoning (i.e., the need to maintain group cohesion and effectiveness). In 
contrast, participants who justified support for these same deviants typically used autonomy 
reasoning (i.e., the need for personal autonomy and choice). A minority of children used 




group functioning reasoning to signify their approval for the traditional deviant. In the case of 
the out-group traditional deviant, participants did not perceive this deviant as an out-group 
member but rather as members of a common in-group which conformed to the generic 
tradition. There was also a developmental trend whereby older participants increasingly used 
group loyalty (i.e., being faithful to others) compared to group functioning reasoning to 
disapprove of deviants who dissented from the generic norm. 
 Finally, when the deviant behaved traditionally, with age individuals increasingly 
used their beliefs about how their own group would evaluate these deviants (i.e., perceived 
in-group norm) to inform their own evaluations of these deviants. Consistent with previous 
research in middle to late childhood (FitzRoy & Rutland, 2010; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; 
Rutland, 2013; Rutland et al., 2005), this study suggests that sensitivity to group norms and 
concerns about social exclusion gets stronger into adolescence. This developing sensitivity to 
group norms into adolescence is likely due to the increasing role of the peer group in 
adolescence and the increasing attention to the importance of ensuring group functioning with 
age (Brechwald & Prinstein, 2011; Horn, 2003).  
Making children more aware of group dynamics, the pressures to conform and the 
legitimacy of resisting conformity can help reduce the potential development of prejudice 
driven by in-group bias. This cannot be achieved simply through legislation or political 
dictate, rather it requires educational interventions that focus on changing social relationships 
(i.e., child-child or child-adult interactions) and children's social-cognitive skills (i.e., social 
perspective taking and moral reasoning) (see Killen et al., 2011).  
 We have demonstrated a context in which the in-group is not preferred, with a deviant 
from the out-group who conforms to a generic norm being preferred to an equivalent in-group 
deviant. We do not suggest that in-group bias is absent in childhood; indeed research shows 
in-group bias is a general phenomenon in childhood (Dunham, Chen, & Banaji, 2013). On the 




contrary, we propose that an often overlooked factor which determines the emergence of in-
group bias has to do with group norms, and specifically how the motivation to conform to 
these norms can contribute to displays of in-group bias or out-group favoritism. The current 
study provides novel data on the early ontogenesis in childhood of the conditions that lead to 
out-group preference. Given prejudice is the opposite of out-group preference, determining 
the contexts in which individuals display out-group favoritism provides a window into 
opportunities for reducing prejudice in adulthood.  
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